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Abstract
Many theories of driver behaviour suggest that unconscious or implicit emotions play a functional role in the shaping and
control of behaviour. This has not been experimentally tested however. Therefore, in this study the effects of emotive
masked images on driver behaviour were examined. While driving a simulator, participants were repeatedly exposed to
negative or neutral emotionally laden target images that were sandwich masked by emotionally neutral images. These
images were encountered across two different trials each of which consisted of 3–4 minutes of driving on a rural road. The
results indicate an effect of the negative target images primarily in reducing the extent of familiarisation occurring between
the first and second experimental drives. This is evident in a reduced decrease in heart rate and a reduced increase in high
band heart rate variability and actual travelling speed from the first to second drives if the negative target image was
presented in the second drive. In addition to these findings there was no clear effect of the target image on subjective
ratings of effort or feelings of risk. There was however an effect of gender, with the majority of the effects found in the study
being limited to the larger female dataset. These findings suggest that unconscious or implicit emotional stimuli may well
influence driver behaviour without explicit awareness.
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Introduction
Many recent models that seek to explain driver behaviour have
come to incorporate functional views on the role of emotions in
driving. These theories include Task Difficulty Homeostasis theory
(TDH) [1,2], Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT) [3], the Multiple
Comfort Zone Model [4], the Risk Monitor Model (RMM) [5–7],
feeling of risk homeostasis [8], and the situational control
framework [9]. The way that emotions are said to effect driving
differs somewhat between the models, for example in the Multiple
Comfort Zone Model [4,10] they operate in a threshold manner
with emotions being produced by breaches in safety margins. This
is in contrast to the account given by RAT [3] or RMM [5–7]
where levels of preferred emotions or feelings are set and
constantly monitored. However, as mentioned above, all the
models view emotions in a functional fashion, suggesting that they
play an important role in biasing or influencing driver decision
making, sometimes even without entering into explicit conscious
awareness. So for example uncomfortable emotions, such as those
related to the risk arising from a narrow road, would signal to the
driver to be cautious and to reduce their speed. RMM in
particular takes a strong functionalist stance suggesting that risk,
and the detection of risk via emotions and feelings, is a vital
evolutionary adaptation for survival [5–7].
Most of the above models approach the issue of emotion via
reference to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis [11,12]. The Somatic
Marker Hypothesis states that emotions, defined as unconscious
physiological states, and feelings, which represent the later
conscious awareness of these emotions, have a significant impact
on human decision making. In particular unconscious emotional
physiological states are presumed to arise in reaction to certain
learnt or innate stimuli, and ‘mark’ such stimuli or situations in
ways that bias decision making towards or away from them. The
presence of these emotional physiological states can typically be
detected via psychophysiological measurements.
The main experimental evidence for the Somatic Marker
Hypothesis comes from a study carried out using the Iowa
Gambling Task that compared neurologically ‘normal’ people
with patients who had impaired emotional systems due to
ventromedial prefrontal damage [13]. The Iowa Gambling Task
involved participants losing or gaining fake US currency by
drawing from four decks of cards. Two of the decks had high gains
but also high losses, making them poor choices in the long run,
and the other two had smaller pay outs but also smaller losses,
making them a better long term choice. What was found is that
even before the ‘normal’ participants could report that they
consciously knew which decks were the best they were producing
detectable changes in skin conductance when choosing a card
from a poor choice deck. This was taken as a sign of somatic, or
body, markers being formed, which predated conscious awareness
and eventually helped the participants to decide which deck was
the best decision. The skin conductance response was missing in
the impaired individuals and they continued to select cards from
the poor decks. This particular interpretation of the Iowa
Gambling task has been challenged however, with some
researchers suggesting the results obtained, at least in terms of
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problems with working memory, attention, or rehearsal learning in
the impaired individuals [14,15].
Outside of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, the majority of the
above driver behaviour models also owe some of their structure in
terms of how they refer to emotions to the work of Taylor [16].
Taylor claimed to show that skin conductance reacted during a
drive at areas of high accident occurrence. Furthermore Taylor
claimed that over time skin conductance levels were kept relatively
stable, and suggested that this meant that drivers were targeting or
trying to maintain a set level of anxiety or risk while driving. This
same targeting view is taken by TDH [1,2], RAT [3] and RMM
[5–7] who all reference Taylor’s findings in terms of the
consistency of skin conductance responses. This view was also
influential on earlier models of driver behaviour such as Risk
Homeostasis Theory [17,18]. The idea of skin conductance
response consistency is not universally accepted however. In
particular, Taylor’s findings have been challenged on the grounds
that skin conductance is a quite reactive and relatively non-specific
measure. Meaning that skin conductance responds to many other
factors in addition to, or instead of, emotional changes
[1,10,19,20]. For instance, it is possible that Taylor’s findings in
terms of skin conductance could be explained as simply arising
through the motor control of the vehicle required for driving [10]
rather than reacting to any changes in, or reflecting the
maintenance of, emotional or risky elements. The Zero Risk
theory of driver behaviour [21,22], and the later Multiple Comfort
Zone Model [4,10], have also challenged the idea of maintaining
and targeting a constant level of risk or anxiety. These two models
instead argue that most of the time drivers experience, both
consciously and unconsciously, no risk or anxiety when driving,
and that when it is experienced it acts as a warning to change
behaviour, unless drivers are otherwise motivated to accept the
experienced risk.
Putting aside the differences between the particular theories,
there is no doubt that driver behaviour models are trending
towards a functional role of emotion and feelings in the control of
driving, particularly when it comes to risk judgment. This trend in
traffic psychology is a reflection of a wider trend in psychology
where the functional importance of emotions and feelings in
decision making is being stressed [1,3,7,23]. For example in Slovic
et al. ’s [24] view of risk assessment there are ‘affect heuristics’
which are fast and automatic emotive reactions to risky situations
that can be used in guiding decision making. This affect based
system is contrasted to the more traditional, analytic, and
subjective utility maximization view of risk assessment, which
can still operate in certain situations. However, the ‘affect
heuristic’ is hypothesized to be commonly used in day-to-day
decision making.
While the idea of implicit or unconscious emotional effects on
decision making has become popular, it presents an interesting
challenge to experimentally test in a complex task like driving.
Exactly how can an emotion be generated in a participant without
it entering into awareness and becoming a feeling? And then, how
can its impact be tested without again explicitly alerting the
participant?
One possible solution to this challenge is the use of masked
images. This is where emotionally charged images are very briefly
shown to participants with other, longer lasting images shown
before and after the emotionally charged image in order to ‘mask’
it from the participant’s conscious perception. The idea is that the
image can still generate an emotive response, but it does so without
entering into the conscious awareness of the participant, or at least
without the participant becoming explicitly aware of it. This
process is also referred to as priming, in that the target images used
are associated with situations that prime or trigger certain
emotions, feelings, and cognitions in individuals via preconscious
processing. In the case of this study for instance it was hoped that
the negative images used would prime reactions in the physiology
of participants and lead to slower speeds and faster reaction times
to road safety relevant stimuli, such as a stop sign. The idea that
emotionally negative images can be processed preconsciously is
well in line with functional thinking in terms of emotions and
feelings, in that it would be potentially evolutionary advantageous
to react to threatening or emotionally negative situations as fast as
possible. However, it should also be noted that whether masked
images are truly unconscious, or subliminal, is a matter of great
debate [25–27]. As such, they will be referred to as simply masked,
rather than subliminal in this paper.
Using masked images has certain merits. Past studies have
shown that emotionally negative masked images produce skin
conductance responses [28–30] and activate areas of the amygdala
that are in accordance with fear or threat detection [31–34]
without being able to be reported as perceived by participants.
Further evidence for the emotional influence of unconscious
images comes from research on patients with blindsight. Blindsight
is a condition where due to damage to the visual cortex individuals
are unaware of visual stimuli but still retain a limited ability to
make judgements about visual aspects of the world around them
[35]. Research with blindsight patients, or with individuals in
which blindsight has been induced [36], has shown that they still
have some ability to detect visual emotional stimuli, and that these
stimuli activate relevant fear or threat detection areas of the
amygdala despite not entering into explicit conscious awareness
[36–38].
Masked images have also been shown to impact on attitudes
and judgements about others [39], as well as the level of hostile
behaviour performed towards them [40]. Additionally, masked
images have been found to affect risky decision-making based on
masked monetary rewards in simple gambling like experimental
tasks [41,42]. There is also some evidence that masked images can
affect attention and mental workload. For example Carlson, Fee,
and Reinke [43] found that participants would react faster on a
dot-probe task when the dot occurred on the same side as a
threatening masked image. In other research [44] it has been
found that presenting masked images showing death and
mutilation or physical threats (such as a growling dog or striking
snake) increased gaze duration towards the images that showed the
physical threat, and decreased gaze duration towards the images
that simply contained physical injury or death.
Ultimately the above studies suggest that masked images can
have some influence on an individual’s decision making or
attention. However, these studies have been carried out with
relatively easy tasks in relatively simple conditions, and we are
unaware of any research examining the influence of masked
images on a complex task such as driving.
Driving is generally viewed as a self-paced task [16,21,45,46], in
that drivers can to a large extent set their own pace of movement
through the road system, and generally can alter and control the
challenge of the driving task. This is mostly done through highly
automated actions [10]. It is however a task that involves many
individual drivers interacting within a large and varied road
system, and with a wide range of regulative control. Navigating
this complex system properly is important, because objectively
speaking at most times drivers and other road users are only
moments away from death or serious injury. A fact that is sadly
well represented in road accidents being the leading cause of death
for people aged 15–29 worldwide, and the 9
th leading cause of
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develop a good understanding of what variables shape and affect
driver behaviour.
The study described in this paper therefore sets out to
experimentally test the influence of implicit or unconscious
emotional signals on driver decision making, with a focus on
driver speed choice. Speed is one of the most prominent road
safety issues. Not only because of the influence of inappropriate
speed choices on the chance of having an accident, but also
because of the undeniable influence of velocity on physical trauma
and property damage when an accident does occur [2,48]. Speed
is also one of the main ways in which drivers can regulate the task
demands of driving, and therefore can ‘self-pace’ the driving task
[16,21,45,46].
Participants in the present study were asked to drive a simple
rural road in a driving simulator while paying attention to a series
of images presented just below the rear view mirror. The images
were presented under the pretence of carrying out a memory task.
Each participant drove the road twice, with one drive involving
the presentation of emotionally negative target images and the
other of emotionally neutral target images. These images were in
both cases backwards and forwards masked by different emotion-
ally neutral masking images. At some point these masking images
would change to include a stop sign. When this occurred
participants had to stop the car as quickly as possible. Information
on speed and stopping time along with subjective impressions of
effort and feeling of risk were collected alongside physiological
measures of skin conductance, heart rate, and respiration.
In line with the functional account of emotion provided by the
various models of driver behaviour discussed above [1–10] it was
predicted that when participants were exposed to the negative
target images they would drive at a slower speed than when
exposed to the neutral target images. This was predicted to occur
due to the production of uncomfortable emotions associated with
the images, which signal to the drivers that something is amiss with
their behaviour or the road environment and therefore leads them
to take action to remove or reduce this emotion. Due to the use of
masking these emotions should occur unconsciously or at least
without explicit awareness, and therefore it is also hypothesised
that any behaviour changes will occur without any meaningful
change in risk or effort ratings between the two different target
image conditions. In addition, in line with a physiological and
functional account of emotion it was also predicted that the
psychophysiological measures taken would show a significant
response in line with a negative emotional reaction arising from
the emotionally negative images. Finally, it was predicted that
when participants were exposed to the negative target images that
they would become more alert to potential road safety related
stimuli and therefore respond faster to the stop sign image in
bringing their vehicle to a stop.
Methods
2.1 Participants and Ethics Statement
Ethics approval, including permission to deceive the partici-
pants, was gained from the University of Groningen Psychology
Ethics Committee. Participants were informed that their informa-
tion would be treated anonymously and that they could withdraw
from the experiment at any time with no penalty. Participants
were also debriefed at the end of the study, and the masking
procedure was fully explained.
Participants were recruited through the English speaking
University of Groningen participant pool and given course credit
for participation. Participants were required to have held a valid
car drivers licence for at least one year. This resulted in 74 females
and 39 males being recruited for the study. However, one female
reported feeling uncomfortable with the simulator during the
practice drive and therefore did not progress in the study. In
addition, two female, and six male participants reported being
explicitly aware of the target images and were also removed from
the sample. Furthermore, seven males and 12 females mentioned
that they thought that perhaps there was an image being shown
that they could not see even though they could not report what it
was. In order to present results that are as conservative as possible
in terms of the awareness of the target images these participants
have also been excluded.
This results in a final sample size of 85 participants. The
remaining 59 females were 21.09 years old on average (SD 2.07)
and had held their licence for an average of 3.19 years (SD 1.97).
The remaining 26 males were 21.62 years old on average (SD
1.83) and had held their licence for an average of 3.44 years (SD
1.41).
2.2 Materials
2.2.1 Driving Simulator. The University of Groningen
driving simulator was used in this study. It is a fixed base
simulator running on STSoftware software. The simulator
consists of three high definition plasma screens, all set to a
refresh rate of 60 Hz. The graphics engine of the simulator
software itself runs at 60 frames per second, which was confirmed
via the FRAPS software package. In total the simulator provided
participants with a 210-degree view of the road environment.
The road environment resembled a simple rural road with a
consistent gentle s-curve in order to create some steering demand
during the task. During all drives speed information was concealed
through the use of a cardboard cut-out. This was to force
participants to rely on their own perception of speed, rather than
the speed provided by the speedometer. The simulated car was set
to operate in automatic gear mode in order to minimise any
movement related artefacts in the collection of the psychophys-
iological data.
2.2.2 Images. The images used during the task were taken
from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS) [49]. The
following images where used as negative target, neutral target, and
masking images:
N Negative target images: IAPS numbers 3000, 3010, 3015,
3053, 3060, 3064, 3068, 3069, 3080, 3102, 3110, 3120, 3150,
3400, 9410, 9433, 9901, 9910, 9911, 9920
N Neutral target images: IAPS numbers 5130, 6150, 7000, 7009,
7010, 7020, 7030, 7037, 7040, 7050, 7060, 7080, 7090, 7190,
7217, 7234, 7235, 7500, 7700, 7705
N Masking images: IAPS numbers 7002, 7004, 7006, 7031,
7035, 7036, 7038, 7042, 7052, 7055, 7056, 7057, 7059, 7100,
7150, 7175, 7224, 7233, 7491, 7950
The negative target images mostly consisted of mutilated and
deceased humans with some images of car accidents. According to
the IAPS standardised scores, the negative images had valence
ratings between 1.31 and 2.5 (mean 1.80), and arousal ratings
between 5.70 and 7.26 (mean 6.59). The neutral target images and
masking images consisted mostly of household items such as mugs,
bowls, and forks, along with some pictures of buildings. The
neutral target images had valence ratings between 4.23 and 5.55
(mean 4.86), and arousal ratings between 2.17 and 3.84 (mean
2.78).
The images used for masking (the masking images) had valance
ratings between 4.45 and 5.55 (mean 4.97), and arousal ratings
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that were used to forward and backwards mask the above neutral
and negative target images during the trials. Variations of the
masking images were also created for the reaction time task that
had standard stop street signs placed in the centre of the images
(see figure 1). All of the images were stored in JPG format, with a
resolution of 2566192 pixels.
2.2.3 Psychophysiological Measures. Participants were
asked to wash and dry their hands and Tin (Sn) electrodes with
some saline paste where taped to the distal phalanxes of the index
and third finger of their left hand to measure skin conductance.
This method of attachment is somewhat unusual, but has been
used successfully in the past and allows for good control of steering
without creating interference in the skin conductance measures
[50]. Participants were also fitted with Polar and Respitrace
belts in order to collect cardiovascular and respiration data.
Profiles of skin conductance and respiration information were
created using the Brain Vision Analyzer software package, and
mean skin conductance and respiration levels were calculated.
Heart rate was processed via the CARSPAN software package,
with each file also being visually inspected for artefacts and
manually corrected if necessary [51]. Along with the collection of
heart rate, spectral analysis was also run in CARSPAN to calculate
heart rate variability in the high (0.15–0.40 Hz) and mid (0.07–
0.14 Hz) frequency bands [52]. Finally Brain Vision Analyzer
was also used to calculate mean heart rate, and mean heart rate
variability.
Due to the variation in the moment the stop sign was shown, the
psychophysiological data was shortened to only account for the
first 180 seconds of driving. Furthermore, there is an immediate
effect of beginning to drive on all the physiological measures, so
the first 30 seconds of data was also removed to eliminate any
biasing effect that this may have caused. This left 150 seconds of
data for use in later analysis. In addition four males and 16 females
had distorted or missing psychophysiological data and had to be
excluded from analyses, resulting in a sample size of 65
participants for the analysis of the psychophysiological data. The
participants in this smaller sample did not significantly differ
(p.0.05) in gender, age, licence status, speed of driving or any of
the subjective measures from the larger 85 person sample, and
therefore are assumed to have come from the same underlying
population.
2.3 Procedure
Participants first filled out a demographic questionnaire to
gather data on their age, gender, and driving experience. The
experimental procedure was then described to them under the
pretence of being a study about the effect of memory tasks on
driving. Participants were told that they were to drive at whatever
speed they found comfortable, but that while doing so they were to
carry out a memory task. This memory task involved paying
attention to constantly changing images that were presented in the
upper centre of the screen (just under the rear view mirror as
shown in figure 2).
The participants were told that they had to count the total
number of times that the currently presented image was the same
image that they had seen presented directly before. Participants
were able to do this as there was a noticeable flash when each
image was presented which signalled that a new image had
appeared. So, if the participants saw a shoe, and then a shoe again,
they would have to add one to the count of image couples that
they had observed. However, if they saw a cup, then a chair, and
then a cup they were to ignore that as none of the images were
repeated directly after each other. They were told that they did not
have to remember what the images were, only the total number of
direct image repeats that they had seen during the drive and that
they would have to write this down at the end of the trial.
Participants were also told that at some point during the drive a
stop sign would appear over top of the normal (masking) images
and that when they saw this sign they were to stop counting
repeats and bring the car to a full stop as quickly as possible.
The images that the participants were instructed to pay
attention to were the masking images mentioned above, and were
presented on the screen for 50 frames (800 ms). Unbeknownst to
the participants in between each masking image a target image
was presented for 2 frames (32 ms). With the timing of the image
presentation confirmed through the use of a high speed digital
camera over three four-minute periods during the initial setup of
the experiment. The target images shown were either negative or
neutral in emotive content depending on the trial. The
presentation of the images began only once the participants had
driven 100 metres, and continued until the participants brought
the vehicle to a complete stop. After three minutes a random timer
was started that triggered the presentation of the stop sign variant
images to replace the masking images within 1–60 seconds.
The masking and target emotive images were selected randomly
every time they were presented and programmed to usually avoid
directly repeating themselves so that the same image would not
Figure 1. An example of a masking image with the stop sign
added.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.g001
Figure 2. Screenshot of the simulator’s centre screen. This shows
the road environment and an example masking image in the position in
which the images were presented during the trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.g002
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randomly occur on occasion, creating the supposed ‘memory task’
for the participants when the masking images would repeat two
times in a row.
Participants were asked to sit in the driving simulator and adjust
the seat so that it was comfortable. They were then given a
practice drive to get familiarised with the simulator and the
memory task. During this practice task no data was recorded. The
practice drive lasted 3–4 minutes, depending on the timing of the
stop sign, and was identical to a neutral image experimental trial.
Also at the start of the practice drive the experimenter verbally
pointed out the first directly repeating image to the participant.
This was done to make sure that the exact nature of the memory
task was understood.
After the practice drive participants were asked if they felt
comfortable with the simulator and the memory task. At this point
all participants stated that they were comfortable and wished to
continue. Then the participants were asked to hold the steering
wheel, but to otherwise sit still and quietly while baseline
physiological measures were taken. These baseline measures were
then collected for 3 minutes.
After the baseline data collection period participants were asked
to drive the road again twice, while carrying out the memory task.
During these two drives data on travelling speed was collected at a
rate of 10 Hz. Also the braking reaction time to the stop sign
image was calculated as the time from when the first stop sign
appeared until the participant had depressed the brake pedal by
more than 5 percent. One trial for each participant involved the
neutral target images and the other the negative target images.
The order was counterbalanced across participants, however due
to scheduling issues, and loss of participants due to the earlier
mentioned incomplete data sets the end result was that 43
participants (32 female, 11 male) drove with the negative target
image trial first and then the neutral, and 42 (27 female, 15 male)
with the neutral target image trial first and then the negative.
After each trial participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire
containing the following open ended questions:
1. How many times during the drive did you see paired
presentations of images?
2. On average, what speed (in km/h) do you think you drove at
during the last trial?
3. On average, what speed (in km/h) would you typically drive
while following the route you just saw?
Then participants were also asked to provide a driving effort
rating for the trial they had just completed on the rating scale for
mental effort (RSME) [39]. The RSME is a unidimensional scale
ranging from 0 to 150, with several unevenly placed anchor points
along it going from ‘absolutely no effort’ at the bottom (a RSME
score of 2) to ‘extreme effort’ near the top (a RSME score of 112).
A modified version of the RSME was also used to assess feeling of
risk, with the effort related anchors being replaced with the
following risk related anchors; absolutely no risk, almost no risk, a
little risk, some risk, rather much risk, considerable risk, great risk,
very great risk, and extreme risk. After the second trial the
participants were additionally asked the following two open ended
questions which served as manipulation checks to make sure that
the negative or neutral images had not been detected:
4. What was/were the difference(s), if any, that you noticed
between the first and second roads you drove?
5. Didyounotice anyimagesduringeitherdrive that seemed out of
place, unusual or particularly disturbing? If so, what were they?
Once participants had completed the practice drive and both
experimental trials, the psychophysiological recording equipment
was removed and they were fully debriefed about the use of the
hidden, neutral and negative images in the experiment. This
included an additional verbal check to see if they had detected the
negative or neutral images, and an opportunity for participants to
ask any questions that they may have had.
2.4 Analysis
Due to the variable nature of when the stop sign was displayed
(1–60 seconds after the first 3 minutes of driving) only the first
3 minutes (180 seconds) of driving were used for analysis of the
effects of the images on speed of travel. This is in contrast to the
150 seconds of data used in the analysis of the psychophysiological
measures mentioned in section 2.2.3 above
The dependent measures analysed in this experiment were
actual speed driven, stopping reaction time, the subjective ratings
of speed, effort and risk, performance on the memory task, and the
psychophysiological measures of heart rate, heart rate variability,
skin conductance and respiration. In addition qualitative data on
differences between the roads and on whether the participants
noted anything unusual were also examined.
Using PASW SPSS 18.0.3 for Windows, individual full factorial
repeated measures analyses were carried out to examine the effect
of the independent variable of the target image type within the
subjects (2 levels, emotionally negative or neutral target image). In
addition the between subjects factors of condition order (2 levels,
neutral image presented first or negative image presented first) and
gender were also examined. Possible interactions effects were
examined and post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction were
used where appropriate. The above analyses were run for both the
total dataset, and separately for the males and females.
Results
3.1 Subjective ratings of speed, effort and feeling of risk
In general the participants gave higher ratings for effort than for
feeling of risk, with average scores between 53.77 and 59.12,
corresponding approximately with a level of ‘Rather much effort’’
on the RSME. Whereas feeling of risk scores averaged between
30.50 and 34.93, placing them somewhere between ‘A little risk’
and ‘Some risk’ on the modified version of the scale. As shown on
table 1 there was no significant main effect of the target image type
(negative or neutral) on subjective ratings of speed, typical travel
speed, effort, or feeling of risk.
There was however a significant interaction of target image type
and condition order for the subjective ratings of travelling speed (F
(1, 81)=8.21, p,.001, g
2=.35) with the second trial generally
resulting in higher average perceived speeds. In combination with
this, trials where the negative target image condition was second
resulted in larger increases in ratings of subjective travelling speed
between the two drives. This indicates that the participants
perceived a speed increase between the first and second drive, but
perceived it as being a greater increase if they had been exposed to
the negative image in the second, rather than first, trial.
A significant (F (1, 81)=4.16, p,.05, g
2=.05) interaction of
target image type, gender and order was also found for ratings of
feeling of risk. This appears to have resulted from the males
tending to give higher average ratings of feeling of risk for the
negative target images than the females (40.72 or 41.70 on average
for the males compared with 28.30 or 30.82 for the females). This
also points to a different effect in terms of the order of image
presentation, in that the males appear to decrease ratings of risk
from the first to the second trial by 6.64 points if the negative
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3.86 if the negative target images were presented second.
Conversely the females always increased their ratings of feeling
of risk from the first to the second drive, and did so more if the
neutral target images were presented second (an increase of 6.59
versus an increase of 3.86 if the negative target images were
second).
There was also a significant (F(1,81)=8.54, p,.01, g
2=.10)
order and target image type interaction on ratings of effort, with
ratings of effort generally decreasing in the second trial, but doing
so more if the negative target images were second (a decrease of
3.75 compared with a decrease of 3.50 if the neutral target images
were second). However if the male and female datasets are
examined separately then this significant order and target image
type interaction is only apparent in the male data (F (1, 24)=6.19,
p,.05, g
2=.21) and is different from the combined dataset. In
that the decreases in effort ratings from the first to second drive are
still apparent in the male data set but are greater when the neutral
target images were second (a decrease of 9.76 compared with a
decrease of 3.10 when the negative target images were second). No
significant main (F (1, 57)=.64, p=.43, g
2=.01) effects of the
images or interaction effects (F(1, 57)=2.48, p=.12, g
2=.04) with
order on ratings of effort were found for the female participants
However, the females did tend to also decrease effort ratings from
the first to the second trial, and did so somewhat less if the neutral
images were second (a decrease of 1.35 compared with a decrease
of 4.11 if the negative images were second), although again this
effect was not significant.
When data from the males and females was examined
separately then a main effect of target image type (F (1,
24)=4.56, p,.05, g
2=.0.16) was found on ratings of typical
speed for the males (N=26), which is not in the combined dataset.
In addition in the male dataset significant target image type and
order interactions were found on typical speed (F (1, 24)=7.45,
p,.05, g
2=.24), subjective travelling speed (F (1,24)=8.87,
p,.01, g
2=.27), and effort (F (1,24)=6.19, p,.05, g
2=.21).
Finally in the male data there was no significant main effect (F (1,
24)=2.81, p=.81, g
2=.11) nor any interaction effects with order
(F (1,24)=.20, p=.66, g
2=.01) of target image type on feelings of
risk. In case of the above effects it seems that the males tended to
report higher subjective travelling speeds in the second trial,
although more so when the negative target images were second.
With an increase of 11.07 km/h on average compared with an
increase of 3.64 km/h if the neutral target images were second.
The impacts in terms of effort are discussed above, with lower
effort being generally reported in the second trial, but more so if
the neutral target image trial was second. The effects seen for
typical speed seems to have arisen because the male participants
who received the neutral and then negative target image trial
order on average only increased their ratings of typical speed by
0.33 km/h between trials. Whereas those who experienced the
neutral and then negative target image trial order increased their
ratings by 2.73 km/h between the first and second trial. This result
is unlikely to be meaningful.
In terms of the results for the females (N=59), they were similar
to those of the total sample, with significant target image and order
interactions for subjective travelling speed (F (1, 57)=54.37,
p,.001, g
2=.49) and feeling of risk (F (1,57)=9.98, p,.01,
g
2=.15). Again, it seems that for the females their perceptions of
the subjective travelling speed increased from the first to the
second drive with larger increases when the negative target images
were presented second (12.22 km/h versus 11.48 km/h when the
negative images were first). As described above, the effect on
feeling of risk for the females was an increase between the first and
second drive, with a larger increase if the neutral target image was
second (6.59 versus 3.86 if the neutral target image was first). As
mentioned above no significant main or interaction effects of the
target image type or order were found for ratings of effort in the
female dataset. As with the combined dataset there were also no
significant main (F (1, 57)=.11, p=0.74, g
2=.74) or interaction
(F (1, 57)=2.16, p=.15, g
2=.04) effects of the target images on
ratings of typical speed either.
Table 1. Subjective ratings of speed, effort, and feeling of risk by target image type, gender, and condition order for the combined
dataset (N=85).
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Negative Neutral Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Subjective Speed (km/h) 60.41 20.53 69.88 20.66 60.69 18.21 72.50 21.02
Typical Speed (km/h) 92.33 15.97 94.07 15.78 88.81 18.04 90.36 15.94
Effort 59.12 24.10 55.62 25.38 57.52 24.83 53.77 26.20
Feeling of risk 31.73 25.92 34.93 26.46 30.50 25.09 34.36 24.71
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects










Subjective Speed (km/h) 1.94 0.17 0.02 1.45 0.23 0.02 0.18 0.68 0.00 42.87 ,.001 0.35 1.3 0.26 0.02 2.36 0.13 0.03
Typical Speed (km/h) 0.17 0.68 0.00 3.89 0.052 0.05 1.06 0.31 0.01 3.05 0.09 0.04 0.7 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.88 0.00
Effort 0.39 0.54 0.01 0.38 0.54 0.01 0.50 0.48 0.01 8.54 ,.01 0.10 2.26 0.14 0.03 1.4 0.24 0.02
Feeling of risk 1.43 0.24 0.02 2.05 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.84 0.00 1.40 0.24 0.02 4.15 ,.05 0.05 4.16 ,.05 0.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.t001
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There was no significant (F(1,81)=2.98, p=.09, g
2=.04) main
effect of target image type on stopping reaction time in reaction to
the stop sign, with an average reaction time of 2.04 (SD=1.03)
seconds for the negative target image trial and 1.87 (SD=.61)
seconds for the neutral target image trial. There were also no
significant interactions or main effect of order or gender (F
(1,81)=.12 to 2.59, p..11, g
2=.00 to .03).
3.3 Driving Speed
As shown in table 2 there was no main effect of target image
type (F (1, 81)=1.69, p=.20, g
2=.02) on average speed driven
during the first 3 minutes of the experimental trials. There was
however a significant main effect of gender (F (1, 81)=8.21,
p,.01, g
2=.09), with males tending to drive faster on average
(114.61 km/h) than the females (96.47 km/h) across all trials.
There was also a significant interaction effect of target image
type and condition order (F (1, 81)=20.25, p,.001, g
2=.20).
This means that speed during the second trial tended to be higher
than during the first, but also that this effect did not appear to be
as pronounced when the negative target images were presented to
participants second. Specifically, when the negative target images
were second there was an increase of only 3.43 km/h on average
from the first to second trial compared with a 7.08 km/h increase
in speed when the neutral target images were second.
As shown in figure 3 when the speed data for the males and
females was examined separately there were quite different
outcomes. In the case of the males (N=26) it appears that there
was no significant difference (F (1, 24)=.06, p=.81, g
2=.00) in
the speed they drove when exposed to either the negative
(113.29 km/h on average) or neutral target images (113.19 km/
h on average). Neither was there a significant interaction of target
image type and order (F (1, 24)=3.62, p=.07, g
2=.13) for the
males. Conversely if only the females (N=59) were examined,
then a significant main effect of target image type was found (F (1,
57)=4.51, p,.05, g
2=.07) along with a significant interaction of
target image type and order (F (1, 57)=27.33, p,.001, g
2=.32).
Therefore in the case of the females it seems that, on average, the
trials with the negative images resulted in lower driving speed
(94.96 km/h on average) than trials with the neutral images
(97.72 km/h on average). Furthermore, as with the total sample, it
appears that females tended to increase their speed from the first to
second drive, but did so to a lesser extent if the negative target
image trial was experienced second. In the females, this resulted in
an increase of 7.91 km/h when the neutral target images were
second, compared with an increase of 3.34 km/h when the
negative images were second. As shown in figure 3 the speed
difference between the negative and neutral target image
conditions in the females began to become apparent after less
than 10 seconds of driving, and is pretty much established by 20–
30 seconds into the drive and then remains relatively constant.
When looking at figure 3 this same initial speed pattern does seem
to appear for the males, but quickly disappears, with some later
average speeds for the negative target image trial exceeding those
of the neutral target image trials. This is not statistically significant
however.
3.4 Heart rate, heart rate variability, respiration and skin
conductance response
All recorded psychophysiological measures were compared
between the two target image trials, but also to the baseline
measurement as a third variable. Furthermore, as with the above
analyses, condition order and gender were included as between
subject factors. It should be noted that, as explained in section
2.2.3, the analysis of the psychophysiological data was carried out
on only 150 seconds of data and with a smaller sample size of 65
participants.
Significant (F (2, 60)=19.16 to 50.02, p,.001, g
2=.39 to .63)
main effects were found on average heart rate, as well as mid and
high band heart rate variability. However post hoc tests with a
Bonferroni correction revealed this was only due to significant
differences between the baseline measurement and the measure-
ments collected during the target image trials (p,.001). This
means that no significant differences in these measurements
between the target image trials was found (p=1.00).
There was also a significant (F (2, 60)=5.85, p,.01, g
2=.09)
main effect of gender on mid band heart rate variability, with
males having a higher variability than females on average.
However, there were no interactions of the target image type
with gender (F (2, 60)=.07, p=.92, g
2=.00) or condition order (F
(2, 60)=.35, p=.71, g
2=.01) for mid band heart rate variability.
A significant (F (2, 60)=5.12, p,.01, g
2=.15) main effect of
target image type on skin conductance was found with the
experimental trials seeming to produce a higher average skin
conductance response than the baseline. However, subsequent
post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction only found a significant
difference between the baseline measurement and the negative
target image trial (p,.05) but no significant difference between the
Table 2. Average speed by target image type, gender and condition order for the combined dataset (N=85).
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Negative Neutral Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Speed (km/h) 98.65 31.16 105.72 29.68 99.10 24.34 102.53 27.39
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects












Speed (km/h) 1.69 0.20 0.02 8.21 ,0.01 0.09 1.31 0.25 0.02 20.25 ,.001 0.20 0.65 0.42 0.01 0.48 0.49 0.01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.t002
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nor between the target image trials themselves (p=1.00). No
significant effects for any of the variables or conditions were found
for the respiration measurements.
There werealso significantinteraction effectsbetweenimage type
and condition order for average heart rate (F (2, 60)=42.14,
p,.001, g
2=.58) and high band heart rate variability (F (2,
60)=5.02, p,.01, g
2=.14). Meaning that the average heart rate
decreased and the averagehigh band heartrate variability tendedto
increase in the second trial. As can be seen in table 3 the average
decrease in heart rate was smaller between the first and second trials
when the negative target image trial was second (a decrease of 6.39
beats per minute versus 6.82 when the neutral target image trial was
second), and the average increase in high band heart rate variability
was higher in these conditions (an increase of 0.34 versus 0.31 when
the neutral target image trial was second).
When the male (N=22) and female (N=43) participants were
examined separately then similar results to those mentioned above
were found, with two exceptions. The first being a significant
(p,.05) difference for the males between their average baseline
respiration measure and the average respiration measure during
the negative target image trial. There was however no significant
difference in respiration for the males between the baseline
measures and the measures during the neutral target image trial
(p=.20), nor any significant difference between the average
respiration in the neutral and negative image trials (p=.69). The
second difference is that for the females there was no main effect of
condition (baseline, negative, or neutral target image) on skin
conductance response at all (F (2, 40)=2.47, p=.10, g
2=.11).
3.5 Memory task accuracy
While the memory task was simply an excuse to have images
presented on the screen, it is worth noting that there was no
significant effect of the type of target image (negative or neutral) on
the number of pairs reported. Rather the participants performed
this task well in both conditions with an average reported number
of image pairs of 11.67 (SD=3.15) during the negative target
image trials and 11.49 (SD=3.81) during the neutral target image
trials. The actual number of image pairs was 12.06 (SD=2.84)
and 11.33 (SD=2.79) for the negative and neutral target image
trials respectively. This indicates that the ‘memory task’ was
equally demanding during both conditions, and that the
participants were paying attention to the images. If the male
and female participants are examined separately then their
performance on this task and the average number of images
presented to them is similar to the combined dataset.
3.6 Reported differences between the roads
At the end of the experiment participants were asked ‘What
was/were the difference(s), if any, that you noticed between the
first and second roads you drove?’ This question, along with a
question about the images, was primarily to check if the
participants had seen any of the target images as the road did
not differ between the two drives. However, only 43.53% (11 male,
26 female) of the participants correctly reported that there was no
difference between the roads. A further 38.82% (9 male, 24
female) reported that something about the construction of the road
had differed. Out of these people, 19 (7 male, 12 female) stated
that either the road in the negative image trial was more curvy (12;
4 male, 8 female) or that the road in the neutral image trial was
less curvy (6; 3 male, 3 female) (or in the case of one female that
the roadside trees were further away during the neutral trial).
Conversely, 14 (2 males, 12 females) participants said that either
the road in the neutral image trial was more curvy (9; 1 male, 9
females) or had more hills (1 female), or that the road in the
negative image trial was less curvy (4; 1 male, 3 females). In nearly
Figure 3. Average speed across the first 3 minutes for the negative and neutral target image trials. Lines are given for the whole sample
(N=85), as well as for the males (N=26) and females (N=59) separately.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.g003
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more curvy it was the road that was driven second. Therefore it is
likely that this impression of more or sharper curves was created by
the fact that participants tended to drive faster during the second
drive. In answer to this question, a further 9 (3 male, 6 female)
participants commented that they had detected more image pairs
during the ‘memory task’, or that the images were placed in a
different position on the second drive (1 female). Of the remaining
4 participants, 2 did not answer this question, and the other 2 just
mentioned being more used to the road on the second drive.
Discussion
According to many models of driver behaviour [1–10] our
feelings and emotions play important functional roles in guiding
driver behaviour. What is more, it is claimed that this can occur
even when emotions aren’t necessarily felt or explicitly considered
as part of the decision making process. The present study set out to
investigate the impact of these implicit or unconscious emotions on
driving behaviour. As such, masked images were used in an
attempt to provoke an emotional response in drivers in a simulator
under the guise of performing a memory task.
The primary behavioural variable examined was driving speed,
and if the total dataset of males and females is examined then there
was no significant main effect of the target image type on driven
speed. However, there was a significant interaction effect of type of
target image, negative or neutral, and the order in which the
images were presented to the participants. This showed that there
was a general tendency for participants to drive faster on the
second trial, most likely due to familiarity and learning effects.
However this general effect also interacted with the type of target
image being used, with the increase in speed being smaller if the
second trial contained the negative target images (an increase of
3.43 km/h on average) than if the neutral target images were
presented second (an increase of 7.08 km/h). This suggests that
the negative target image could have had a suppressing effect on
speed in terms of reducing the normal increase associated with
familiarity or learning effects.
Gender also played a role in this effect, and when the male and
female datasets were examined independently then was no effect,
interaction or otherwise, of the target images on the males speeds.
However for the females there was the above interaction effect
mentioned for the combined dataset, and also a further significant
main effect of image type on driving speed. This resulted in
significantly lower average speed overall for the female drivers
during the negative target image trials (94.96 km/h) than during
the neutral target image trials (97.72 km/h). This gender
difference is apparent in the statistics and also easy to see from
the graph of speed over time shown in figure 3 and suggests that
most, if not all, of the effects seen in terms of actual driven speed in
the larger combined dataset are due to the reactions of female
participants.
The difference between the male and female participants could
be explained in several ways. Firstly it is possible that the negative
target images were more emotionally impactful for the female
participants than the males. Certainly there is a difference in both
valence and arousal ratings by gender for many images in IAPS
[49], and specifically if the negative target images used in this
experiment are examined, then the female IAPS ratings are lower
in valence (1.52 on average) and higher in arousal (6.98 on
average) than the average provided by the male IAPS ratings (2.16
valance, 6.15 arousal on average). An increased reactivity to
negative emotional images in females is also supported by studies
reporting greater neurological [53,54] and autonomic reactions
[55,56] to explicitly presented negatively emotional images in
females. This is especially so if the negative images contained
humans [57] as many of the images used in the current experiment
did. It is entirely possible therefore that the increased emotional
Table 3. Average heart rate, heart rate variability, skin conductance response and respiration amplitude by target image type,
gender and condition order for the combined dataset (N=65).
Negative then Neutral order Neutral then Negative order
Baseline Negative Neutral Baseline Neutral Negative
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
HR (bpm) 79.92 11.39 90.05 11.15 83.22 10.35 79.38 12.80 89.27 11.43 82.89 12.05
Mid HRV (mi
2) 6.94 0.87 6.22 0.89 6.27 1.20 7.48 1.18 6.51 1.00 6.60 1.05
High HRV (mi
2) 7.32 0.92 6.36 0.80 6.66 0.90 7.78 1.24 6.64 1.00 6.98 1.11
SCR (mho) 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.32 0.19 0.18
Respiration amplitude 1.04 0.70 0.72 0.52 0.75 0.62 1.89 4.81 1.03 1.39 0.87 1.45
Statistical tests
Main effects Interaction effects










HR (bpm) 44.19 ,.001 0.60 0.06 0.82 0.00 0.06 0.81 0.00 42.14 ,.001 0.58 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.16 0.86 0.01
Mid HRV (mi
2) 19.16 ,.001 0.39 5.85 ,.01 0.09 3.64 0.06 0.06 0.35 0.71 0.01 0.07 0.92 0.00 0.39 0.70 0.01
High HRV (mi
2) 50.02 ,.001 0.63 1.13 0.29 0.02 1.63 0.21 0.03 5.02 ,.01 0.14 0.26 0.78 0.01 0.03 0.97 0.00
SCR (mho) 5.12 ,.01 0.15 0.57 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.00 2.43 0.10 0.08 0.70 0.50 0.02 1.64 0.20 0.05
Respiration amplitude 1.49 0.23 0.05 0.86 0.36 0.01 0.96 0.33 0.02 0.34 0.72 0.01 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.42 0.66 0.01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029857.t003
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may also hold for stimuli that have been implicitly or
preconsciously processed. If this is so further studies should use
different image sets depending on the gender of the participant.
Another possible explanation for the gender difference is that
given the effect sizes observed that there may not been enough
males to detect any consistent effect of the images on behaviour.
This study did set out to recruit a large number of both male and
female participants to take part; however we did not succeed in the
case of the male subjects.
Interestingly, at least in the case of the females, the effect of the
negative target image on driving speed seems to be mainly on the
initial setting of the speed, which is then generally maintained
throughout the drive (see figure 3). This pattern of a slower
average driving speed for the negative image occurring near the
start of the drive does also seem to appear briefly for the males, but
then disappears quickly as the drive continues. The fact that the
effect on driving speed occurs so quickly could be taken as support
for the assertions of various models [1–10,16,21,58] that driver
behaviour is influenced by a tendency to return to or maintain
some kind of homeostatic body balance or preferred safety margin.
Unfortunately it cannot throw light onto the differences between
these models, in terms of suggesting whether this body balance is
itself constantly monitored and a set level targeted [1–3,5–8,16] or
if it is arrived at through an aversion to signals that arise because of
a unbalance in this body state [4,10,21,22,59].
Moving away from speed to the recorded psychophysiology
there is a significant target image type and order interaction effect
in both heart rate and high band heart rate variability that is
potentially interesting. This interaction effect is found in the
combined dataset, in the males and, most importantly in light of
the above speed effects, in the female dataset. The interaction
indicates decreases in heart rate, and increases in high band heart
rate variability between the first and second drive. This is
consistent with a familiarity or relaxation effect with the second
drive becoming less stressful or effortful for the participants.
Interestingly however, the decrease in heart rate and increase in
high band variability was lessoned if the negative target images
were second. This, when combined with the above speed data
where the increase in speed was also less when the negative images
were second, is suggestive of a physiological effect of the negative
target images. Specifically it appears that the usual familiarity
effect in terms of increasing speed, but also in terms of decreased
physiological load for the second trial was lessoned if the negative
images were presented second. That this effect is seen in the
cardiovascular measures but not in skin conductance, which does
not seem to meaningfully differ between the trials, or in the case of
the female participants even between the baseline and the driving
task, is interesting. While both cardiovascular and skin conduc-
tance measures are sensitive to changes in emotional arousal, heart
rate and high band heart rate variability are generally considered
to be more reflective of changes in mental workload or effort
[52,60]. This may imply that the negative target images used are
actually impacting on the mental workload or effort required by
the task rather than creating feelings or emotions of risk, and it is
the physiological reaction to this increase in effort that leads to the
reduction in driving speed. If so this would be more in line with
predictions made by models such as the multiple comfort zone
model [4,10] or task difficulty homeostasis [1,2] which claim that
emotions and feelings associated with the difficulty or effort
required in the driving task are more common guides of driver
behaviour than emotions related to risk.
Care should be taken with this interpretation however. Another
way to interpret the lack of an impact on skin conductance
response would be to say that because the participants (at least the
females) drove, on average, slower when influenced by the
negative image they were bringing their body state back into its
normal range. This process of returning to a normal, comfortable,
or set body state may occur quite quickly, during the first few
seconds of driving, and therefore may not show up in the averaged
psychophysiological data presented here. Especially since the first
30 seconds of psychophysiological data had to be excluded from
analysis. This data was excluded because there was an immediate
large impact of beginning to drive and starting to perform the
memory task on the cardiovascular and skin conductance
measures. The above mentioned physiological consistency or
homeostasis is what would be predicted by models of driver
behaviour such as RAT [3] or RMM [5–7] which more closely
embrace the work of Taylor [16]. Therefore as already mentioned
it is difficult to use this data to distinguish between the competing
models in traffic psychology.
A related explanation for the lack of a meaningful response to
the target images in skin conductance could be due to ceiling
effects related to performing the driving task. Previous studies
which have shown an effect of masked images on psychophysi-
ology have tended to involve simple experimental tasks carried out
in a standard lab environment [28–30]. This relatively simple task
environment means that any physiological impact will be easier to
detect. Furthermore, the physiological impacts of the masked
images reported in these previous studies are often relatively small.
On the other hand, simply driving has a large impact on
psychophysiological measures, even with the simple road design
used in this study [61]. This driving task related impact may
therefore have masked detection any physiological effect of the
emotional images. This however does make it even more
significant that the order effect on heart rate and high band heart
rate variability discussed above was found.
It was also thought that the negative image may have primed
the participants to be aware of any possible threats and made them
ready for action, resulting in a faster reaction time in response to
an image of a stop sign being presented on the screen. However,
no such effect was found in the combined, male, or female
datasets. This could again be explained through the above
mentioned return to a normal body state at the start of the drive.
If participants had indeed quickly eliminated or balanced out the
effect of the negative image on their body state by lowering their
speed, then the negative image would possibly have no further
impact, and could not help in raising their alertness to the onset of
the stop sign. Another explanation could be that the stop sign in
itself, while a road safety related stimulus, is not threatening
enough when it occurs in an open road situation with no other
traffic. Therefore perhaps future experiments investigating the
influence of masked negative images on threat detection could use
a more relevant stimulus such as a car unexpectedly pulling out
from a parking spot.
There was also a significant interaction effect of target image
and order on participant’s perceived speed in the combined, male,
and female datasets. This reflects that actual travel speeds
increased between the two trials. However, in this case the
perceived increase in speed was larger if the negative images were
presented during the second trial (a perceived average increase of
11.8 km/h compared to 9.48 km/h if the neutral target image was
second). At least for the female participants this is the reverse of the
effect on actual driven speed, with the speed increase in this case
being smaller when the negative target images were presented
second. This could be interpreted as exposure to the negative
target images creating an impression of faster driving speeds and
therefore influencing the speed actually driven. However, it is clear
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present in the female participants, is mostly contributed to by the
male participants who did not seem to be significantly affected by
the target images in terms of their actual driving speed.
The results for the subjective ratings of feeling of risk and effort
are somewhat difficult to interpret for the combined dataset. In the
case of ratings of risk there is not only a significant interaction of
target image type and order, but also a significant interaction with
gender. This means that in the case of the male participants they
decreased their ratings of feeling of risk from the first to second
trial if the negative target images were presented first (a decrease of
6.64 on average), but increased their ratings if the negative target
images were second (an increase of 3.86 on average). However, if
the male dataset is analysed separately there are no significant
target image or order effects or interaction on ratings of feeling of
risk, which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions from this
finding. Conversely if only the female participants are examined
there is a significant target image type and order effect with a
tendency to increase ratings of risk between the first and second
drives, with larger increases occurring if the neutral target images
were second (an average increase of 6.59 compared with an
increase of 3.86 if the negative target images were second). This
again is difficult to explain, but perhaps could be related to the
participants, correct, perception that speeds were increasing from
the first trial to the second. It is therefore possible that participants
rationalised that since they were driving faster, then the risk must
also be greater. Although why this effect occurs significantly more
in the presence of the neutral image for the females is not clear.
However, it does at least in the case of the female participants
suggest that the emotionally negative images were not having any
significant increasing effect on the female participant’s feelings of
risk.
The situation in the case of ratings of effort differs from that for
ratings of feeling of risk. In in the combined dataset there is a
significant order and target image type interaction, with ratings of
effort generally decreasing between the first and second trials, and
this effect seems to be larger if the negative target images were
second (a decrease of 3.75 compared with a decrease of 3.50 if the
neutral target images were second). However, if the male and
female datasets are examined separately it appears the majority of
this effect comes from the male participants, who in contrast to the
combined dataset and the female participants, decrease their
ratings of effort more if the neutral target images were second. In
the case of the female participants their data appears similar to
that for the combined dataset, although there were no significant
main effects or interactions.
The above findings for ratings of effort are particularly
interesting in light of the previously discussed impacts of the
target images on perceived speed, actual speed driven and on the
psychophysiological measures of heart rate and high heart rate
variability. In this case the target image type and order interaction
effect observed in the other variables is reversed in the combined
dataset for ratings of effort, or in the case of the females is non-
significant. This, when combined with no consistent effect on
ratings of subjective feelings of risk do seem to suggest that the
participants subjective feelings were not altered by the images,
despite producing the observed effects on speed, perceived speed
and psychophysiology.
Finally, when asked about the differences between the roads
they had driven only 43.53% of the participants correctly
identified that the roads had not differed. If the remaining
participants are examined then 38.82% reported something had
changed about how the road was constructed. Typically
participants mentioned that the second road they drove had more
curves. The rest of the participants either commented on the
memory task, suggesting that they had seen more pairs on one of
the trials, or did not answer this question. That some participants
did report a difference in the road is likely due to the demand
characteristics of being in an experiment and being asked if there
were differences. Having been asked, they perhaps felt pressured
to say that there were. It is interesting however that this resulted in
the second drive being generally attributed the characteristic of
being more curvy, and this is likely to do with the fact that the
second road tended to be driven at a higher speed. A similar
finding was made by Lewis-Evans and Charlton [62] where
drivers ascribed risky characteristics such as heavier traffic, missing
road marking and more curves to a simulated road that had been
narrowed by 2 meters, but was otherwise identical to other roads
they had driven.
Apart from the points already made above there are several
other potential issues that can be raised with this study. One
obvious issue is the question of whether the participants really were
unaware of the images. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a
controversial issue [25–27], and therefore care has been taken to
ensure that at the very least our participants could not explicitly
report having seen the images. As such during the setup of the
experiment the timing of the image presentation in the simulator
was confirmed over three separate four minute periods using a
high speed camera. Also a manipulation check question was
included asking participants if they had noticed anything unusual
about the images and they were also debriefed after the
experiment and asked if they had seen any of the images. Based
on this manipulation check, two females and six males who
explicitly reported seeing the images were removed from the study,
and data from an additional seven males and 12 females were
removed on the grounds that they mentioned that maybe they saw
something in between the masking images. These last 19
participants generally made statements along the lines of ‘perhaps
there was an image between the ones I saw, but I could not tell you
what’ or ‘I think I saw flashes of colour’. The removal of these
participants means that the remaining data is only from
participants that explicitly stated that they did not see anything
unusual with the images, and did not at any time during the
experiment, including during the debrief, mention explicit
awareness of the target images nor any suspicion that a masking
procedure was occurring. As such we are relatively confident that
the participants were not explicitly aware of the target images.
Future studies may however want to consider using a forced
recognition task for each subject as part of the experiment in order
to confirm that participants were completely unable to consciously
perceive the target images.
A greater proportion of males (15.38%) explicitly saw the target
images compared to the female participants (2.78%). Although a
similar proportion of males (17.95%) and females (16.67%) were in
the group that was removed for suspecting that masking was
occurring. This gender difference could be related to the generally
better visuospatial abilities typically attributed to males [63,64].
Also, anecdotally, those most males who explicitly saw the images
also reported during the debriefing period that they considered
themselves to be gamers. Since video games are also suggested to
improve visual attention [65–68], particularly for fast moving or
rapid stimuli, this may also be a contributing factor in noticing
masked images.
Another issue is with the order effect that was encountered. The
general tendency for participants to increase their speed from the
first to second trial is not uncommon in simulator research [69],
but could still be of concern. On one hand this may have been
because the practice time given to the participants was not
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and simulator. However, as reported in section 2.3, participants
were asked if they felt comfortable with the memory task and the
simulator after the practice drive and offered the option of
repeating the task if they felt it was necessary. None took this
opportunity. Nevertheless, this could be addressed in future studies
through the provision of a longer practice period. It is also worth
noting that the order effects found where always in interaction
with the target image variable, and that there were no main effects
of the trial order alone on any of the variables.
In addition to a longer practice period, longer experimental
driving trials could also be investigated. These could perhaps
include changes from emotionally neutral to emotionally negative
image targets occurring on several occasions during the drive itself.
This would also allow for the psychophysiological data to be
collected for longer periods, and reduce the problem of having to
remove the initial increase in these variables caused by simply
starting to drive. All this said, at least in the case of the female
participants, the effect of the negative target images on speed
behaviour appears to occur within the first 20 seconds or so after
the images have been presented and then maintained overtime.
Therefore the time periods used in this experiment do appear
sufficient to catch at least this critical moment in terms of the
impact of the target images on driving speed.
Another potential issue is the high level of variability in the
speed data. This was likely caused by the fact that participants
were denied the use of a speedometer and told to drive at whatever
speed they were most comfortable at, resulting in large between
subjects differences in speed. However, due to the nature of the
within-subjects repeated measures analyses used in this study the
large variability between the subjects should not have had a
negative impact on the results.
The fact that the participants were denied the use of the
speedometer could also challenge the validity of this experiment.
The speedometer was removed in an attempt to force participants
to rely on their own perception of speed, and therefore hopefully
encourage them to use the automatic or implicit control processes
that are most likely to be affected by the masked target images.
Furthermore it allowed for the question about participants
perceived speed of travel to be asked. Still, the lack of a
speedometer is not a common occurrence in every day driving.
However, evidence from studies of drivers gaze patterns show that
they typically devote very little time, as low as 0.6% of total gaze
time during a drive, glancing at their speedometers [70]. This
indicates that most of the time drivers on the road are relying on
their own perception of speed, not information from the
speedometer, much like they had to in this experiment.
The type of target images used could also be questioned,
especially in terms of the negative target images. In the case of this
study the images were selected as being some of the lowest valence
and highest arousal negative images in IAPS, along with four
motor vehicle accident related images. This means that the
majority of the negative target images were of mutilated and
deceased humans removed from the typical driving context. These
IAPS images were used as they were of a known quality, taken
from an internationally recognised sample, and had been
previously used in masking studies [30,44]. As such this
experiment should be taken as a proof of concept. Future studies
could perhaps use more driving relevant stimuli, such as risky
traffic situations or images related to the presence of police
enforcement.
The validity of the ‘‘memory task’’ that the participants were
performing in terms of normal driving could also be challenged. It
is indeed a somewhat unusual task to be paying attention to an
additional visual element and trying to detect repeated patterns in
it while driving. However driving is a visual task, and often does
require that visual attention be split, and that changes or the lack
of change in the visual environment be detected and remembered.
For example it may be important to recognise landmarks and
know if you have seen them before when trying to navigate from A
to B. Also given that the same task was required of all participants,
and seems to have been consistently well performed, it is unlikely
that it impacted on the results of the experiment in any meaningful
way.
Ultimately it does appear that the masked negative target
images did have an impact on the behaviour of the participants in
this experiment, at least in the case of the females. This seems to
primarily have occurred via suppression or a lessening of the
normal familiarity effect between the first and second experimental
drives when the negative target image was shown in the second
drive. The data from the psychophysiological measures in terms of
heart rate and high band heart rate variability support this
interpretation and when coupled with the lack of any meaningful
effect on subjective ratings of effort or risk suggests that the impact
of the negative target images was not explicit. Interestingly there
does seem to be one clear subjective effect, with the participants
perceiving the second drive as faster in general, but more so when
the negative target image was second. This therefore suggests an
impact of the negative target image on speed judgement, although
care should be taken with this interpretation as the majority of this
effect seems to be amongst the male, rather than the female,
participants.
The explanations given above for the results of this study could
be labelled as speculative. However, this study does represent the
first attempt to use masked images as part of a driving task, which
in itself is noteworthy. We are unaware of any other studies
examining the effect of masked images on a behaviour as complex
as driving, which just by itself can have a large impact on
psychophysiology [40]. Therefore the very fact that any effect in
behaviour was found despite the usually somewhat small changes
in physiology in reaction to masked images reported by other
studies [15,16,17] is significant. That the masked images can
produce an effect on such an important variable for road safety as
speed suggests that the influence of implicit or unconscious
emotions on driver behaviour should be further studied. With this
in mind, the results of this study are an interesting starting point,
and can hopefully be used to help to guide future research.
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